Israel und Irans Atomanlagen

Die Spekulationen eines israelischen Angriff auf die iranischen Atomanlagen vom vergangenen November scheinen korrekt gewesen zu sein. Die New York Times berichtet, dass die israelische Regierung Bush um Hilfe bei einem Militärschlag gebeten hat, dieser hätte jedoch abgelehnt und auf andere Maßnahmen verwiesen.

Die New York Times schreibt:

President Bush deflected a secret request by Israel last year for specialized bunker-busting bombs it wanted for an attack on Iran’s main nuclear complex and told the Israelis that he had authorized new covert action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort to develop nuclear weapons, according to senior American and foreign officials.

Insofern war meine Spekulation, dass Bush einem solchen Angriff zustimme würde, falsch. Aber der Rest war ein Volltreffer: Israel bat um Überflugrechte über den Irak:

White House officials never conclusively determined whether Israel had decided to go ahead with the strike before the United States protested, or whether Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel was trying to goad the White House into more decisive action before Mr. Bush left office. But the Bush administration was particularly alarmed by an Israeli request to fly over Iraq to reach Iran’s major nuclear complex at Natanz, where the country’s only known uranium enrichment plant is located.

The White House denied that request outright, American officials said, and the Israelis backed off their plans, at least temporarily.

Wieso macht mich der Nachsatz „jedenfalls vorerst“ nervös?

But the tense exchanges also prompted the White House to step up intelligence-sharing with Israel and brief Israeli officials on new American efforts to subtly sabotage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a major covert program that Mr. Bush is about to hand off to President-elect Barack Obama.

Gut zu wissen, dass da auch noch andere Lösungen in der Planung sind. Ich hoffe, dass diese funktionieren und idealerweise nicht große Mengen Radioaktivität freisetzen.

The interviews also suggest that while Mr. Bush was extensively briefed on options for an overt American attack on Iran’s facilities, he never instructed the Pentagon to move beyond contingency planning, even during the final year of his presidency, contrary to what some critics have suggested.

Den Schuhe ziehe ich mir an…

The interviews also indicate that Mr. Bush was convinced by top administration officials, led by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, that any overt attack on Iran would probably prove ineffective, lead to the expulsion of international inspectors and drive Iran’s nuclear effort further out of view. Mr. Bush and his aides also discussed the possibility that an airstrike could ignite a broad Middle East war in which America’s 140,000 troops in Iraq would inevitably become involved.

Die Gefahren schätzt die Administration richtig ein.

Instead, Mr. Bush embraced more intensive covert operations actions aimed at Iran, the interviews show, having concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies were failing to slow the uranium enrichment efforts. Those covert operations, and the question of whether Israel will settle for something less than a conventional attack on Iran, pose immediate and wrenching decisions for Mr. Obama.

The covert American program, started in early 2008, includes renewed American efforts to penetrate Iran’s nuclear supply chain abroad, along with new efforts, some of them experimental, to undermine electrical systems, computer systems and other networks on which Iran relies. It is aimed at delaying the day that Iran can produce the weapons-grade fuel and designs it needs to produce a workable nuclear weapon.

Also keine geheimen Sprengungen, sondern „nur“ kleine Nadelstiche in der Fertigungskette, um den Prozess zu verlangsamen. Das ist, wenn es funktioniert, ein wichtiger Zeitgewinn – eine langfristige Lösung freilich nicht. Das sehen einige in der US-Regierung auch so:

Knowledge of the program has been closely held, yet inside the Bush administration some officials are skeptical about its chances of success, arguing that past efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program have been detected by the Iranians and have only delayed, not derailed, their drive to unlock the secrets of uranium enrichment.

Late last year, international inspectors estimated that Iran had 3,800 centrifuges spinning, but American intelligence officials now estimate that the figure is 4,000 to 5,000, enough to produce about one weapon’s worth of uranium every eight months or so.
While declining to be specific, one American official dismissed the latest covert operations against Iran as “science experiments.” One senior intelligence official argued that as Mr. Bush prepared to leave office, the Iranians were already so close to achieving a weapons capacity that they were unlikely to be stopped.

Das sind schlechte Neuigkeiten, aber

Others disagreed, making the point that the Israelis would not have been dissuaded from conducting an attack if they believed that the American effort was unlikely to prove effective.

Damit sind wir wieder bei dem Szenario aus meinem ursprünglichen Beitrag. Die Welt am Abgrund. Geübt haben die Israelis den Angriff schon:

Last June, the Israelis conducted an exercise over the Mediterranean Sea that appeared to be a dry run for an attack on the enrichment plant at Natanz. When the exercise was analyzed at the Pentagon, officials concluded that the distances flown almost exactly equaled the distance between Israel and the Iranian nuclear site.

Update 11.01.2008:

Inzwischen berichtet auch Spiegel Online über den NYT-Artikel. Zusätzlich meldet er, dass Obama angekündigt hat, im Umgang mit dem Iran einen neuen Ansatz wählen zu wollen. Er will sowohl Respekt gegenüber dem iranischen Volk, als auch Erwartung gegenüber den Führern ausdrücken. Auch Angebote für die Aufgabe des Atomprogramms sind denkbar. Also Zuckerbrot und Peitsche, statt die Nur-Peitsche-„Strategie“ von Bush.